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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
COMMENTS
Mandatory Maternity Leaves for Teachers-The Equal Protection
Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The consti-
tution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordi-
nance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere
as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood. The harmony, not to say the identity, of interests and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband. . . .The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be
adopted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based
upon exceptional cases.'
Women can no longer be treated in the manner described above,
yet many state laws and regulations have as their underlying basis pro-
tection of the female. An example of this is the standard mandatory
maternity leave regulations of some school boards. These regulations
generally require that if a teacher becomes pregnant she must notify the
school board of the expected date of normal delivery. She will then be
required to take a leave of absence, usually beginning at the end of the
fourth or fifth month of pregnancy, and often continuing for several
months after delivery.' These regulations have recently been under at-
tack on a number of fronts' and two United States Courts of Appeals
'Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting),
2There are wide variations on this theme. An Atlanta school board regulation granted a leave
of absence for tenured pregnant teachers but treated untenured pregnant teachers as having "re-
signed." After the birth of the child the untenured teacher could return to the school system only
as a substitute teacher. This policy was struck down in Jinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.
Ga. 1971). The San Francisco School District policy was to require a leave of absence two months
before birth which continued for one month after the birthof the child. This policy was struck down
in Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Williams v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Jinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp,
254 (N.D. Ga. 1971), modified, 464 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1972); La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd, 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd
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have reached opposite conclusions regarding their validity under the
equal protection clause.
In La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education4 the Sixth Circuit
struck down a school board rule requiring an unpaid leave of absence
from school duties beginning five months before expected delivery and
continuing until the beginning of the first term after the child reaches
three months of age. The school board attempted to justify its regulation
as providing for continuity of classroom education, relieving the board
of burdensome administrative problems, and removing pregnant teach-
ers as the source of "pointing, giggling and . . . snide remarks,' 5 but
the court found that the regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable in
its overbreadth and thus denied pregnant teachers equal protection of
the laws. The court reasoned that any teacher disability (including the
common cold) causes some administrative problems; that the basic
rights involved in the employment relationship cannot be made to yield
to embarrassment; that the medical evidence presented no support for
the regulation; and that there was no employer interest at all involved
in the three-month post-delivery leave requirement.
In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board8 the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed its earlier panel opinion in the same case7 by
upholding a school board regulation that required that notice of the fact
of pregnancy be given six months in advance of the date of expected
birth and that employment terminate four months prior to that date.
The teacher had contended that the decision as to when to start matern-
ity leave was an individual one, otherwise she would be subjected to an
impermissible discrimination based on her sex. The majority of the
closely divided court disagreed, holding that the regulation was not an
invidious discrimination based on sex and that the school baord had a
legitimate interest in fixing reasonable dates for maternity leaves.
This comment will examine the equal protection analysis of the
on rehearing en banc, No. 71-1707 (4th Cir., Jan. 15, 1973); Amster v. Board of Educ., 55 Misc.
2d 961, 286 N.Y.S. 687 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist. 5 Pa.
Cmwlth. 365, 285 A.2d 206 (1971).
4465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The district court
had found the regulation reasonable on the grounds that it was for the pregnant teacher's protection
(citing indignities suffered, violence in the schools, accidental injury in the corridors and medical
complications) and that it provided for continuity in the classroom program.
Vd. at 1187.
'No. 71-1707 (4th Cir., Jan. 15, 1973).
7Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Cohen and La Fleur decisions and explore the effect of Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 19648 on policies respecting pregnancy? The following
discussion and conclusions though narrowly phrased in terms of "preg-
nancy" and "school board" are equally appropriate to other conditions
unique to women in other employment situations.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""0 This clause has been
applied to all state legislation (and regulations of state agencies) where
classification of individuals is involved. The Supreme Court has consis-
tently recognized that the equal protection clause does not deprive the
states of all power to classify, 1 but does require that the treatment of
different classes in different ways bear some rational relationship to a
legitimate state objective.' Thus the Constitution forbids not discrimi-
nation but "invidious discrimination."' 3
The determination of whether or not a statute or regulation consti-
tutes an "invidious discrimination" has become refined in recent years.
In economic and regulatory cases the test has been whether there is
some "reasonable basis" for the discrimination. 4 This test focuses on
the purpose of the classification and has been applied to give the states
much leeway in providing different treatment for different classes.
Under this test a regulation will be invalidated only where no "state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."'" It has been
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
'This comment will not discuss the Equal Rights Amendment passed by Congress March 22,
1972, which is currently in the process of ratification. The proposed constitutional amendment
states: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. REs. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. REs. 8, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The possible impact of this amendment on maternity leave regulations, as
well as its prospeots for ratification, is speculative. For an exhaustive comment on the Equal Rights
Amendment see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (1911).
"See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York,
303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938).
"Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
'
4Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
15d.
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said that in economic and regulatory matters the Court has presumed
the regulation valid, placed the burden of showing no rational basis on
the complaining party, and in fact almost abandoned the review of such
equal protection questions. 6
Where a "suspect classification" or "fundamental right" is in-
volved, a much stricter test has been applied to state regulations. Under
the "compelling state interest" test, the state must be able to point to
some compelling governmental interest promoted by the regulation or
statute in question before it will be upheld.17 Thus a significant burden
of justification is placed on the state.18
What constitutes a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental
right" is not altogether clear because the Supreme Court has not enunci-
ated "a rational standard, or even points of reference, by which to judge
what differentiations are permitted and when equality is required."' 9
Classifications based on race, 2 national ancestry, 21 alienage,2 and
wealth23 have been treated as "suspect," with racial classifications re-
ceiving the strictest treatment. Personal interests found to be "funda-
mental" include procreation,24 education,25 voting,28 rights respecting
criminal procedure,27 and the right to travel.21
In testing the mandatory maternity leave regulations against the
equal protection clause one must look first to the classification to
determine whether it is "suspect." If not, the compelling state interest
test may still be invoked if there is a "fundamental interest" involved.
If neither a "suspect classification" nor a "fundamental interest" is
present, then the regulation needs only to have some reasonable basis
in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. 2
"Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
"Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Pro-
inotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966).
"See. e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
"See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
"3See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S.12 (1956).
"Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
2See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
"Arguments that sex-based discrimination violates the equal protection clause have not fared
well in the Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court did not find a sexual classification violative
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A. Are Maternity Leave Regulations Sex Classifications?
Most of the cases involving regulations concerning maternity leave
simply assume that pregnancy is a sex classification." In La Fleur the
court found the regulation to be inherently based on a sex classification
because, though men are subject to many types of disabilities, only
women were singled out for restrictions upon their employment. 31 Chief
Judge Haynsworth, writing for the majority in Cohen, rejected as too
simplistic the leap from the physical fact that only women can become
pregnant to the conclusion that the regulation of pregnancy and matern-
ity is a classification based on sex.32 He pointed out that invidious
discrimination based on a sex classification occurs only in instances
where the two sexes are in actual or potential competition with one
another.33 This proposition gets some support from Reed v. Reed,34
a recent Supreme Court decision that concluded that only dissimilar
treatment of men and women who are "similarly situated" violates the
equal protection clause. The fact that only women can become pregnant
could arguably remove all possibility for "competition" between the
sexes35 and make it impossible for men and women to be "similarly
situated" in respect to the regulation.
It is also arguable that a maternity leave regulation, by itself, does
not discriminate between men and women. Rather, while the regulation
applies to everyone, it is nature that makes the regulation apply only to
of the equal protection clause until 1971 when in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), it struck down
an Idaho probate law giving preference to men over women in the administration of estates. Until
Reed, the Court seemed to share Mr. Justice Bradley's beliefs about the status of women quoted
at the beginning this comment. Several manifestations of the Court's past philosophy are, Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), holding that the state's fixing maximum working hours for women
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable under the due process clause since women need protection
in employment; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), holding that a state law prohibiting a
female from being licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the owner was
not a denial of equal protection of the laws; and Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upholding a
state statute excluding women from jury service unless they voluntarily applied for it.
""See, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd, 467
F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on rehearing en banc, No. 71-1707 (4th Cir., Jan. 15, 1973); La
Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1972).
1'465 F.2d at 1188.
32No. 71-1707, at 6.
3Id.
34404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (dictum).
-"No. 71-1707, at 6.
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women." As Chief Judge Haynsworth noted, no man-made law or
regulation excludes men from becoming pregnant, and no law can re-
lieve women from it." In short, the regulations here involved can be
seen as no different from many other instances where the law is more
burdensome on some than others simply because of the nature of things.
Chief Judge Haynsworth cited laws punishing the forcible ravishing and
carnal knowing of women, laws prohibiting or licensing prostitution,
and regulations requiring that soldiers be clean-shaven as examples. It
should be noted that an analogous argument has been made concerning
wealth classifications. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin v. Illinois"
and Douglas v. California, 3 argued that in each case the state had
made no discriminatory classification; rather it was the defendant's
condition of poverty that caused the unequal treatment. The majority
of the Court in each of those cases rejected Harlan's argument and
found a denial of equal protection.
To dismiss the contention that maternity leave regulations involve
sex classifications because there is no "competition" between men and
women in becoming pregnant or because the argument is "simplistic"
subverts a realistic analysis of the issue. The irrefutable physical fact is
that only women can become pregnant. When the state classifies on the
basis of physical attributes unique to one group, it necessarily classifies
on the basis of that group. If a state statute forbade all those susceptible
to sickle-cell anemia from serving on juries it would surely be recognized
as making a racial classification since only Negroes are susceptible.
Even more basically, if a school board adopted a regulation denying sick
leave to those teachers who had black skins, there would be no doubt
that it was a racial classification. Similarly, any regulation singling out
pregnant teachers for discriminatory treatment must be recognized as
a sex classification for the "simple" reason that it operates only against
women.
To say that the maternity leave regulation is not a sex discrimina-
tion because there is no competition between men and women in becom-
ing pregnant merely clouds the issue with an irrelevancy. There certainly
is no competition in becoming pregnant, but there is competition for
employment and earnings, and this is the area in which the mandatory
381d.
371d.
-351 U.S. 12, 34-36 (1955).
"9372 U.S. 353, 361-63 (1963).
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maternity leave regulation operates to oust women from their jobs while
a man in a similar situation" would not be forced to quit.
B. The Compelling State Interest Test
1. Suspect Classification? Assuming arguendo that mandatory
maternity leaves involve a classification based on sex, such classification
may not necessarily be "suspect." Generally, sex-based discriminations
have been tested under the more lenient rational basis test.4 Neverthe-
less, two recent cases have treated sex as a suspect classification and
have applied the stricter compelling state interest test. In comparing
sex-based discrimination to other "strictly scrutinized" classifications,
one federal court concluded that "it is difficult to find any reason why
adult women, as one of the specific groups that compose humanity,
should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group.""2 The
California Supreme Court has also found sex to be a suspect classifica-
tion.43 The court reasoned:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which
the class members are locked by the accident of birth. What differen-
tiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect classifications is
that the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society. . . .The result is that a whole class is rele-
gated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or
characteristics of its individual members."
The finding of a sex-based classification in La Fleur was made in
a context where the determination was of little or no consequence to the
outcome. Since the court was not prepared to include sex among the
group of "suspect classifications," and since it found that the maternity
leave regulation failed the less strict reasonable basis test, the decision
would have been the same even if the classification had been between
"
0See No. 71-1707, at 19-20 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter gives as an example prosta-
titis, a uniquely male disease. Though surgery can be scheduled within a reasonable time range to
suit the convenience of the patient, the male teacher is not required to give advance notice of the
operation nor to seek permission tocontinue work until date of the operation. The same is true for
any elective surgery.
"
2E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"
2United States ex. rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968).
"Sail'er Inn, Inc., v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17,485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971).
"Id. at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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pregnant teachers and teachers with other disabilities, rather than a sex
classification. If sex becomes generally accepted as a suspect classifica-
tion,45 the determination in La Fleur that the maternity leave regulations
are sex-based discriminations may have a more far-reaching effect than
the Sixth Circuit intended. For instance, while the use of the reasonable
basis test may leave some room for the school boards (or other
employees) to regulate maternity leaves, perhaps with a short leave
requirement, the compelling state interest test may prohibit all group
administration of maternity leaves.
2. Fundamental Right Involved? Assuming arguendo that there
is no sex-based discrimination in the maternity leave regulations or, that
if there is, that sex is not a "suspect classification" and that the regula-
tion may be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective, the com-
pelling state interest test may nevertheless be invoked if there is a "fun-
damental right" involved." The maternity leave regulations involved in
La Fleur and Cohen touch on two possibly fundamental rights-the
right to bear children and the right to work.47 In Skinner v. Oklahoma"
the Supreme Court held that procreation was "one of the basic civil
rights of man."'9 The Court there struck down as a violation of the equal
protection clause a state statute authorizing sterilization of persons
more than twice convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude, but
excluding certain offenses such as embezzlement. Because of the great
difference between maternity leave regulations and a sterilization stat-
ute, Skinner is easily distinguishable, thus making the right to bear
children argument tenuous at best.59
A more persuasive argument available in these cases is the funda-
"At least one authority believes this is likely. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas
and the Return ofthe "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716,741 (1969).
In fact, sex-based classifications have rarely been found to be violations of the equal protection
clause. See note 25 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
7It appears that the right-to-work argument was made in the trial of La Fleur, because the
district court rejected it, 326 F. Supp. at 1214, but it has been accepted by another district court
in Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"316, U.S. 535 (1942).
"Id. at 541. Presumably procreation is also a basic civil right of women.
"Not only was there a possible fundamental right involved in Skinner, but also a suspect
classification, wealth. It is arguable that the right to procreate is not by itself a fundamental right,
but only in combination with a suspect classification. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(upholding against an equal protection attack the sterilization of mental defectives in state institu-
tion.) Moreover, in La Fleur and Cohen the teachers were denied not the right to procreate, but
only the right to work while in the process of procreating.
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mental nature of the right to work, which is temporarily denied by the
maternity leave regulations. The authority for the status of the right to
work as a fundamental right stems from Traux v. Raich,5' where the
Court held violative of the equal protection clause a statute requiring
certain employers to employ electors or natural-born citizens as eighty
percent of their work force. The Court in so holding said that "the right
to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.""2 Many other cases
have recognized the importance of the right to work, 3 and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has used the compelling state interest test in a right-
to-work case. In Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State54 the court struck down
a California statute prohibiting the employment of aliens on public
works as a violation of the equal protection clause, stating that "[any]
limitation on the opportunity for employment impedes the achievement
of economic security, which is essential for the pursuit of life, liberty
and happiness; courts sustain such limitations only after careful scru-
tiny."
Though neither La Fleur nor Cohen accepted the above bases for
applying the compelling state interest test, it is nevertheless interesting
to speculate as to the effect of the use of this strict test on maternity
leave regulations. The most immediate effect would be to shift the bur-
den of proof from the teacher to the school board. Under the
reasonable-basis test the teacher has the burden of showing that there
is no reasonable basis for the regulation, but where a fundamental right
or suspect classification is involved, the school board would have the
burden of showing a compelling state interest.
While the La Fleur court had no difficulty finding a violation of
'239 U.S. 33 (1915). It should be noted that this decision antedates the compelling state
interest test.
21d. at 41. It has been asserted that the author of the sentence in the fourteenth amendment
containing the equal protection clause believed that the right to work was a natural right secured
to all citizens by the privileges and immunities clause, but believed the right so important that he
intended it to be encompassed by the fourteenth amendment as well. Avins, The Right to Work
and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 18 LAB. LAW J. 15 (1967).
" See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
"'71 Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969). The fundamentality of
the right to work was reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in a later case involving both a
sex-based classification and the right to work. Sail'er Inn, Inc., v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I, 485 P.2d
529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329(1971).
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the equal protection clause by the five-month leave requirement, a closer
question is presented by regulations requiring only a one-month or two-
week leave of absence. It may be relatively simple for a willing court to
find a reasonable basis for such regulations, but not a compelling state
interest. Administrative justifications have consistently been rejected as
coming within the zone of "compelling" interests in similar cases. 55
Continuity of education in the classroom, the school board's main justi-
fication for the regulations, may often be better obtained by allowing
the pregnant teacher to continue teaching as long as possible-especially
where the end of the school term is near. Thus any maternity leave
regulation that treats pregnant teachers as a group may be overbroad
and therefore a denial of eual protection by analogy to the reasoning of
Kramer v. Union Free School District." There the Supreme Court
recognized that limiting the franchie to those who are primarily inter-
ested in school affairs was a "compelling" interest, but held that the
statute limiting the vote to property taxpayers violated the equal protec-
tion clause because it was too broad in its exclusions. Since it would be
virtually impossible to draw a maternity leave regulation that dealt with
pregnant teachers as a group that was not "overbroad," the compelling
state interest test would require individual determination of maternity
leave by the school board.
3. The Reasonable-Basis Test. In La Fleur and Cohen the courts
reached opposite conclusions on whether there was some reasonable
basis for the extended maternity leave regulations. Each school board
offered similar justifications for the regulations-administrative
burdens, protection of the pregnant teacher, and continuity of education
in the classroom-but only the Cohen court found these persuasive.
The administration of maternity leaves under the regulations in
these two cases was relatively simple. The teacher gave notice of the
expected date of arrival, and four or five months before that date she
was required to quit work. Each school board argued that determination
of maternity leaves on an individual basis would take up too much of
the school board's time because there would have to be conferences
between the teacher, school board officials, and the teacher's physician
(if only by means of letter). The court in La Fleur recognized the admin-
"See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-
38 (1969).
55395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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istrative convenience of the uniform mandatory maternity leaves, but
found such convenience no justification because it was "not the only
value concerned." 7 Quoting from Stanley v. Illinois5 the court reasoned
that "[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination," but when it forecloses the real issues
(here competency of the teacher) it needlessly runs the risk of inundating
important individual interests, and, therefore, cannot stand. The Cohen
court, on the other hand, emphasized the need and opportunity to find
a more permanent replacement rather than a mere substitute teacher.
Accordingly it found it reasonable to require a standard date for begin-
ning maternity leave"'9
Protection of the pregnant teacher's health was also urged as a
justification in La Fleur and Cohen. The lower court in La Fleur went
to great lengths to point out how the problems of pregnancy were accen-
tuated by remaining at school."0 It pointed out the incidence of violence
in the Cleveland schools, the rate of accidental injury to teachers, the
hazards of maintaining order in the halls and corridors, and complica-
tions of pregnancy such as toxemia and placenta previa. The Sixth
Circuit dismissed these justifications without even mentioning them by
declaring that under no construction of the record was there medical
evidence supporting the extended maternity leave required by the regu-
lation.6  The panel in the earlier Cohen decision also found no medical
justification for the regulation involved since women are more likely to
be incapacitated during the first two trimesters of pregnancy than dur-
ing the later stages.12 This argument was ignored, however, in the subse-
quent en banc decision.
The main justification for mandatory maternity leaves presented
by each school board was the need to preserve continuity of education
in the classroom.62 The school boards felt that a uniform date for begin-
ning leave would enable them to anticipate the absence in advance and
thus have a substitute rady to take over the class. Here again the regula-
tions operated against the medical evidence which indicated that compli-
17465 F.2d atl 187.
-92 S. Ct. 1208, 1215 (1972).
'No. 71-1707, at 10-11.
0326 F. Supp. at 1210-11. That there was some medical reason for the regulation was refuted
in Cohen. 326 F. Supp. at 1160.
1465 F.2d at 1188.
6467 F.2d at 264. The Court of Appeals adopted the lower court's findings.
"See id. at II; 465 F.2d at 1186.
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cations causing unexpected absences occurred more frequently during
the early stages of pregnancy, prior to the mandatory leave date re-
quired by the regulation." Moreover, any disability, including elective
surgery or even the common cold, would cause an absence and conse-
quent disruption of continuity of classroom instruction, but there was
no leave of absence requirement as to them. The Sixth Circuit recog-
nized the validity of these considerations and concluded that there was
no reasonable basis for the mandatory maternity leave requirement.
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, attempted to distinguish preg-
nancy from other disabilities by comparing it to sudden, unexpected
disabilities such as mononucleosis or breaking a leg,66 and concluded
that since pregnancy was planned, it was reasonable to require a
"planned" leave. What this reasoning ignores is that though pregnancy
can easily be distinguished from disabilities which arise suddently and
with no warning, there are many other "elective" or "planned" disabili-
ties which are indistinguishable from pregnancy in their effect on conti-
nuity of classroom education." Yet of these, only pregnancy is singled
out for uniform mandatory leave treatment by the school board regula-
tions. Furthermore, as the dissent points out, the continuity-of-
education justification was particularly disingenuous on the facts pre-
sented. 8 Mrs. Cohen's principal had requested that she be allowed to
teach through the end of the first term, but strict adherence to the
regulation prevailed with the consequent effect of creating a greater
disruption than there otherwise would have been.
In light of the split of opinion over the validity of four- and five-
month mandatory leaves, it is interesting to speculate on the constitu-
tionality'of a shorter mandatory leave requirement-for example, a one-
month required leave. The considerations would be the same, but the
justification may become more reasonable for the shorter leave require-
ment. The crucial issue would seem to the medical evidence. 9 If there
G'See 326 F. Supp. at 1160.
0465 F.2d at 1188.
"No. 71-1707, at 9-10.
"'The teacher will be taken out of the classroom for an uncertain length of time by any surgery
or hospitalization. To the extent that such surgery or hospitalization is scheduled in advance for a
future date it is indistinguishable from pregnancy. Examples of this type of disability are hernia
operations, extraction of wisdom teeth, nasal reconstructions, tumor removals, and any number
of other operations.
"'No. 71-1707, at 19 n.2 (Winter, J., dissenting).
c"Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), upheld a state
maternity leave policy requiring that leave begin two months prior to the expected date of birth
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were a history of pregnant teachers having complications in the last
month of pregnancy, then perhaps there would be a reasonable basis for
such a regulation, but when most complications occur early in preg-
nancy, the better reasoning would seem to be to follow La Fleur and
find the one-month required leave a violation of the equal protection
clause.
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Congress, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 undertook
to aid minorities in entering the mainstream of American life by ensur-
ing that they could compete for jobs on a non-discriminatory basis.7 To
this end, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was prohibited.72 "Sex" as a prohibited basis for
discrimination is somewhat unique, since women make up a majority
of the population and thus are well within the mainstream of American
life. In fact "sex" was added to the Act by a floor amendment in an
apparent attempt to prevent passage of the bill.73 But notwithstanding
the fact that women may be in the mainstream of American life, they
have never occupied the same status in the work force that men have.
largely upon the testimony of a physican who said that during the later stages of pregnancy women
become less efficient because they were irritable, increasingly susceptible to headaches, make more
trips to the bathroom and snack bar, and require assistance to get around and to do things that
they could normally do alone. Id. at 39.
For a contrary opinion, compare Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F.
Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
7042 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
7
'Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166 (1971).
7242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
7 See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (remarks of Congresswoman Green). Congressman Smith
(of Virginia) offered his floor amendment one day before the Act passed. Id. at 2577. Congressman
Dowdy (of Alabama) had also proposed amendments prohibiting sex-based discrimination to
several other sections of the bill: the Public Accomodations section, id. at 1979; the Public Facilities
section, id. at 2264-65; and the Public Education section, id. at 2280-81. Every male Congressman
voicing support of Congressman Smith's amendment to Title VII voted against the House bill as
a whole. Id. at 2804-05 (Smith, Dowdy, Tuten, Pool, Andrews, Rivers, Gary, Huddleston, Watson,
and Gathings).
The retention of the sex amendment to Title VII by the Senate seems to have been prompted
by the President's wife. See Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Inter-
pret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 678. After Senator Dirksen
announced his intention to delete the sex provision, Professor Murrary of Yale wrote a memoran-
dum advocating retention and circulated it to, among others, Lady Bird Johnson. Several days later
Mrs. Johnson's secretary advised Professor Murray that the sex provision would remain in the bill.
Id. at 678 n.44.
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At the time the La Fleur and Cohen cases were brought, school
boards were not covered by the Act.74 Prior to the decision of the court
of appeals in each case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
was signed into law amending Title VII to include school boards within
its coverage. 75 Thus maternity leave regulations must now satisfy not
only the equal protection clause, but also Title VII and the guidelines
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued
thereunder.
Section 703(a) of the Act makes it an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer, on the basis of sex, (1) to discriminate against an
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, or (2) to classify or limit his employees in such a
way as to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or ad-
versely affect his status as an employee. 7 Section 703(e)77 exempts sex-
based discrimination from the rule of section 703(a) in instances where
sex is a "bona fide occupational qualificaton" (BFOQ) reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.
To aid in the administration of Title VII the Act creates the EEOC 78
and vests it with the power to bring civil suits to enforce the Act where
conciliation has failed.
Because of the lack of hearings on the sex provision of Title VII
the meaning of "sex" has never been entirely clear. Even where there is
some legislative background there has been trouble defining the scope
of the prohibition on sex discrimination. Thus, notwithstanding the
House's rejection of an amendment to Title VII that would have limited
the Act's prohibition to discrimination based solely on race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin," the Fifth Circuit has held that discrimina-
tion based on sex plus some other reason was not prohibited by the Act.
7142 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(I) (1970), as amended, Equal Emoyment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (state's and their political subdivisions not included in
the definition of "employer"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 104. (Title VII not applicable to educa-
tional institutions with respect to the employment of individuals who perform educational activi-
ties).
7"Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103. The Act was signed and became effective on
March24, 1972.
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
7742 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
1"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1970).
"Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 105.
"110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964).
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In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.8 the Fifth Circuit upheld a com-
pany policy of hiring men with pre-school age children but refusing to
hire women so situated. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was denied
a job not because of her sex, but because of her sex plus having pre-
school age children. This "sex-plus" reasoning was subsequently va-
cated by the Supreme Court."2
There has been less doubt over the prohibition of more explicit sex
discrimination where "sex" as a broad classification is used as the sole
basis for the discrimination. A prime example of this is where sex is used
as a definition, such as a school board regulation that required that its
teachers be solely "male" or solely "female." It has been said that
explicit discrimination also includes classification schemes based on
physical attributes that are characteristic of only one sex-such as the
ability to become pregnant.83 This line of reasoning is supported by
several EEOC guidelines. The EEOC has said that individuals are to be
considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of
any characteristics generally attributed to the group. 4 This guideline
was endorsed by a federal district court in Schattman v. Texas Employ-
ment Commission5 and was interpreted to prohibit a maternity leave
policy that required an employee to quit work two months prior to the
date of expected delivery. Additional guidelines have recently been is-
sued declaring that excluding employees from employment because of
pregnancy is prima facie a violation of Title VII and requiring that
employers treat disabilities caused by pregnancy and childbirth like all
other temporary disabilities.87
It is with respect to these last two guidelines that La Fleur and
Cohen have their major impact. Though the EEOC's guidelines are
entitled to great deference,8 they do not carry the force of law. The
apparent effect of La Fleur and Cohen, then, is to create a split of
11411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
"zPhillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
'Developments in the Law, supra note 71, at 1170.
-29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(l)(ii) (1971).
'1330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
The district court's decision was reversed on appeal on the ground that the Texas Employment
Commission was not subject to the Act. The Fifth Circuit went on to find that there was no denial
of equal protection because there was a reasonable medical basis for the two-month maternity leave
policy.
-29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1972).
-29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972).
'mGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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authority on the validity of these pregnancy guidelines. 9 The Sixth
Circuit's decision that the maternity leave regulation involved a sex
classification supports these guidelines at least to the extent of sustain-
ing them against constitutional attack. The Fourth Circuit, on the other
hand, may have invalidated the pregnancy guidelines, for if maternity
leave regulations are not sex-based discriminations they are not within
the prohibition of section 703(a) of the Act.
Even if one assumes that maternity leave regulations are within the
ambit of the Act, there remains the possibility that problems in the later
months of pregnancy may justify a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" exception. An initial problem here is the scope of section 703(e)
of the Act. The provision states that it is not an unlawful employment
practice to "hire and employ" on the basis of sex where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification. 0 It has been suggested that the quoted
language limits the BFOQ exception to the threshold determination of
whether or not to hire an individual.9 While this would surely be the
correct interpretation if the language were simply "hire," the addition
of the words "and employ" would seem to comprehend an on-going
relationship covering the terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment. Further semantic difficulties are raised by the use or the word
"qualification," which on its face comprehends only initial suitability
for employment. Upon scrutiny, however, it would seem that to the
extent that maintenance of the "qualification" is a prerequisite to keep-
ing the job, it becomes a condition of employment. 2 On these interpre-
tations, then, the BFOQ section is coextensive with the unlawful em-
ployment practice section.
The major issue that section 703(e) raises is the extent to which its
implicit recognition of physical and cultural differences between the
sexes will be allowed to justify discriminations based on sex. The EEOC
has maintained that the BFOQ exception is to be construed narrowly, 3
and this would seem necessary to prevent the exception from emasculat-
ing the rule, but the first case applying the BFOQ exception to sex
discrimination adopted a broad equal-protection-type test. In Bowe v.
"Both La Fleur and Cohen arose before title VII was applicable to political subdivisions of
states so the validity of the EEOC guidelines was not directly in issue in either case. No. 71-1707,
at 2 n.1; 465 F.2d at 1186.
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1971).
"See Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J., supra note 73, at 719.
92/d
.
9329 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1971).
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Colgate-Palmolive Co.94 the district court, in upholding a thirty-five-
pound limit on lifting by women (thus excluding them from some jobs),
stated the test to be "whether the discrimination of the employer is
rationally related to an end which he has a right to achieve-production,
profit, or business reputation." Thus, where a discriminatory rule was
rationally related to one of these objectives it was protected from being
an unlawful employment practice by section 703(e). This test fails com-
pletely to consider individual capabilities.
Perhaps the most widely recognized statement of the scope of the
BFOQ exception is Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.95 The court there, in finding a thirty-pound weight-lifting limit
discriminatory, stated that "an employer has the burden of proving that
he had reasonable cause to believe, that is a factual basis for believing,
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties of the job involved." 6 While this "all or sub-
stantially all" test does not consider capabilities individually,97 it is a
much narrower interpretation of the BFOQ exception than that of the
district court in Bowe.
The Weeks test leaves open the possibility that school boards could
maintain certain maternity leave regulations notwithstanding the deter-
mination that they are discriminations based on sex. The application of
the BFOQ exception where pregnancy is the reason for discriminatory
treatment is the inverse of its normal application. Here the school
board, rather than proving that being male is a BFOQ for the job, must
prove that the absence of the condition of being pregnant is a BFOQ.95
The matter of proof of the BFOQ is the crux of the determination
of whether or not the maternity leave regulation will be allowed. For
the regulation to be upheld, the school board must be able to point to a
factual basis for believing that the safety or efficiency of substantially
all pregnant teachers would be adversely affected by their continued
teaching after a certain stage of pregnancy. The Sixth Circuit in La
9"272 F. Supp. 332, 362 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
-5408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
'id. at 235.
"The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), involving a company
requirement of a high school diploma or a passing grade on an intelligence test, provides some
indication that qualifications should be measured with respect to the individual's capabilities. The
Court there stated that "[w]hat Congress has commanded [in Title VII] is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. at 436.
"See Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J., supra note 73, at 722.
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Fleur said that no factual basis exists for a regulation requiring leave
after the fourth month of pregnancy. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits in
Cohen and Schattman0 stated that there is a factual basis for a regula-
tion requiring leave after the fifth or seventh month of pregnancy." In
each of these cases, however, there was conflicting medical evidence
presented. So, while a school board could point to Schattman for
authority for a two-month leave requirement, it could not be assured of
prevailing because of the vagaries of the medical evidence that would
be presented."'
III. CONCLUSION
The lesson for school boards (and other employers) from La Fleur
and Title VII is that regulations founded upon general stereotypical
assumptions of the needs and capabilities of women employees will no
longer be tolerated. It would seem that neither the equal protection
clause nor Title VII, at their present stage of interpretation, requires
strict individual treatment, though such treatment is to be commended.
The command of the Sixth Circuit and the Congress is tht school boards
should cast aside their historic, often outmoded, reasons for extended
maternity leave requirements and re-examine the facts to see if such
requirements are needed and, if so, what a reasonable leave would be.
The Fourth Circuit in upholding the maternity leave requirement has
taken a step backward against the flow of the times and has moved
toward the viewpoint of Mr. Justice Bradley with which this comment
began.
There are several alternatives open to school boards. They could
maintain a maternity leave policy with a short (less than two months)
duration; they could continue their present extended leave policies, but
provide partial or whole pay during the absence; or they might abolish
the leave policy altogether and leave the problem up to the teacher and
her physician. 1 ' Since different courts have reached opposing results
based on essentially the same medical evidence, perhaps the best ap-
proach for a school board to take would be to operate without any leave
policy for a period of time. If problems arose with teachers in the later
'"Schattan is factually distinguishable from the teacher pregnancy cases in that Mrs. Schatt-
man's job entailed no physical exertion on public contact, whereas a teacher encounters a consider-
able portion of each.
'®See Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"'Id. at 449-50.
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